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Countries  differ significantly  in the way in which they regulate  the entry  of new
businesses. To meet government  requirements  for starting  to operate a business  in Mozambique,
an entrepreneur  must complete 19  procedures  taking  at least 149 business  days and pay US$256
in fees. To do the same, an entrepreneur  in Italy needs to follow 16  different procedures,  pay
US$3,946  in fees and wait at least 62 business  days  to acquire the necessary  permits. In contrast,
an entrepreneur  in Canada can finish the process  in 2 days by paying  US$280 in fees and
completing  only 2 procedures.
In this paper, we describe  the required  procedures  governing  entry  regulation,  as well as
the time and the cost of following  these procedures,  in 85 countries. We focus on legal
requirements  that need to be met before  a business  can officially  open its doors,  the official  cost
of meeting  these requirements,  and the minimum  time it takes to meet them if the government
does not delay  the process. We then use these data to evaluate  economic  theories  of regulation.
Our work  owes a great deal to De Soto's [1990]  path-breaking  study of entry regulation  in Peru.
Unlike  De Soto,  we look at the official  requirements,  official  cost and official  time -- and do not
measure  corruption  and bureaucratic  delays  that further  raise the cost of entry.
Pigou's [1938]  public interest  theory of regulation  holds that unregulated  markets  exhibit
frequent failures,  ranging  from monopoly  power to externalities. A government  that pursues
social  efficiency  counters  these failures and protects the public through regulation. As applied  to
entry,  this view holds that the goveniment  screens new entrants  to make sure that consumers  buy
high quality  products from "desirable"  sellers. Such  regulation  reduces market failures such as
low quality  products from fly-by-night  operators  and externalities  such as pollution.  It is "done to
1ensure that new companies meet minimum standards to provide a good or service.  By being
registered, new companies acquire a type of official approval, which makes them reputable
enough to engage in transactions with the general public and other businesses."  [SRI 1999, p. 14)
The public interest theory predicts that stricter regulation of entry, as measured by a higher
number of procedures in particular, should be associated with socially superior outcomes.
The public choice theory [Tullock 1967, Stigler 1971, Peltzman  1976] sees the
government as less benign and regulation as socially inefficient.  It comes in two flavors.  In
Stigler's  [1971] theory of regulatory capture, "regulation is acquired by the industry and is
designed and operated primarily for its benefit."  Industry incumbents are able to acquire
regulations that create rents for themselves, since they typically face lower information and
organization costs than do the dispersed consumers. In this theory, the regulation of entry keeps
out the competitors and raises incumbents'  profits.  Because stricter regulation raises barriers to
entry, it should lead to greater market power and profits rather than benefits to consumers.
A second strand of the public choice theory, which we call the tollbooth view, holds that
regulation is pursued for the benefit of politicians and bureaucrats  [McChesney 1987, De Soto
1990]. Politicians use regulation both to create rents and to extract them through campaign
contributions, votes, and bribes.  "An important reason why many of these permits and
regulations exist is probably to give officials the power to deny them and to collect bribes in
return for providing the permits." [Shleifer and Vishny 1993, p. 601].  The capture and tollbooth
theories are closely related, in that they both address rent creation and extraction through the
political process.  The capture theory emphasizes the benefits to the industry, while the tollbooth
theory stresses those to the politicians  even when the industry is left worse off by regulation.
2In principle, the collection of bribes in exchange for release from regulation can be
efficient.  In effect, the government can become an equity holder in a regulated firm.  In practice,
however, the creation of rents for the bureaucrats and politicians through regulation is often
inefficient, in part because the regulators are disorganized, and in part because the policies they
pursue to increase the rents from corruption are distortionary.  The analogy to tollbooths on a
highway is useful.  Efficient regulation may call for one toll for the use of a road, or even no tolls
if the operation of the road is most efficiently financed through general tax revenues.  In a
political equilibrium, however, each town through which the road passes might be able to erect
its own tollbooth.  Toll collectors may also block alternative routes so as to force the traffic onto
the toll road.  For both of these reasons, political toll collection is inefficient.
In the tollbooth theory, the regulation of entry enables the regulators to collect bribes
from the potential entrants and serves no social purpose.  "When someone has finally made the
decision to invest, he then is subjected to some of the worst treatment imaginable.. .In a few cases
this treatment consists of outright extortion: presenting the investor with insurmountable delays
or repeated obstacles unless he makes a large payoff..." [World Bank 1999, p. 10]. More
extensive regulation should be associated with socially inferior outcomes, particularly corruption.
We assess the regulation of entry around the world from the perspective of these theories
by addressing two broad sets of questions.  First, what are the consequences of the regulation of
entry, and in particular, who gets the rents?  If the regulation of entry serves the public interest, it
should be associated with higher quality of goods, fewer damaging externalities, and greater
competition.  Public choice theory, in contrast, predicts that stricter regulation is most clearly
associated with less competition and higher corruption.
3A second question  we examine  to distinguish  the alternative  theories of regulation  is
which governments  regulate entry? The public interest model predicts  that governments  whose
interests  are more closely aligned  with those of the consumers,  which we think of as the more
representative  and more limited governments,  should  ceteris paribus regulate  entry more strictly.
In contrast,  the public choice model predicts that the governments  least subject  to popular
oversight  should  pursue the strictest  regulations,  to benefit themselves  and possibly  the
incumbent  firms. Knowing  who regulates  thus helps to discriminate  among  the theories.
Our analysis  of exhaustive  data on entry  regulation  in 85 countries  leads to the following
conclusions. The number of procedures  required  to start up a firm varies from the low of 2 in
Canada  to the high of 21 in the Dominican  Republic,  with the world average of around 10. The
minimum  official  time for such a startup varies  from the low of 2 business days in Australia  and
Canada  to the high of 152 in Madagascar,  assuming  that there are no delays  by either the
applicant  or the regulators,  with the world average  of 47 business  days. The official cost of
following  these  procedures  for a simple firm  ranges from under 0.5 percent of per capita GDP in
the US to over 4.6 times per capita GDP in the Dominican  Republic,  with the world-wide
average  of 47 percent of annual per capita income. For an entrepreneur,  legal entry  is extremely
cumbersome,  time-consuming,  and expensive  in most countries  in the world.
In a cross-section  of countries,  we do not find that stricter regulation  of entry  is associated
with higher quality  products, better pollution records  or health outcomes,  or keener competition.
But stricter  regulation  of entry  is associated  with sharply higher  levels of corruption,  and a
greater  relative  size of the unofficial  economy. This evidence  favors  public choice over the
public interest  theories  of regulation.
4In response, a public interest theorist  could perhaps argue  that heavy regulation  in some
countries  is a reflection  of both significant  market failures  and the unavailability  of alternative
mechanisms  of addressing  them, such as good courts or free press. In addition,  corruption  and a
large unofficial  economy  may be inadvertent  consequences  of benevolent  regulation,  and hence
cannot be used as evidence  against the public interest view. Such inadvertent  consequences
might obtain as a side effect of screening  out bad entrants  [Banerjee  1997,  Acemoglu  and Verdier
2000], or simply  as a result of a well-intended  but misguided  transplant  of rich-country
regulations  into poor countries. Because  of this logic, the question  of which countries  regulate
entry more  heavily may  be better suited  conceptually  to distinguish  the alternative  theories.
We find that the countries  with more open access  to political power, greater  constraints
on the executive,  and greater  political rights have less burdensome  regulation  of entry  -- even
controlling  for per capita income -- than do the countries  with less representative,  less limited,
and less free governments. The per capita  income control is crucial  for this analysis  because it
could  be argued  that richer countries  have both better governments  and a lower need for the
regulation  of entry,  perhaps  because they  have fewer market failures  or better alternative  ways of
dealing  with them. The fact that better governments  regulate  entry less, along with the
straightforward  interpretation  of the evidence  on corruption  and the unofficial  economy,  point to
the tollbooth  theory: entry  is regulated  because  doing so benefits the regulators.
The next section  describes  the sample. Section  3 presents our basic  results on the extent
of entry  regulation  around  the world. Section  4 asks who gets the rents from regulation. Section
5 presents  the main results on which governments  regulate.  Section 6 concludes.
5II. Data
A. Construction of the Database
This paper is based on a new data set, which describes the regulation of entry by start-up
companies in 85 countries in 1999.  We are interested in all the procedures that an entrepreneur
needs to carry out to begin operating legally a firn  involved in industrial or commercial activity.
Specifically, we record all procedures that are officially required of an entrepreneur in order to
obtain all necessary permits and to notify and file with all requisite authorities. We also calculate
the official costs and time necessary for the completion of each procedure under normal
circumstances.  The study assumes that the information is readily available and that all
governmental bodies function efficiently and without corruption.
We collect data on entry regulation using all available written information on start-up
procedures from government publications, reports of development agencies such as the World
Bank and USAID, and government web pages on the Internet.  We then contact the relevant
government agencies to check the accuracy of the data.  Finally, for each country, we
commission at least one independent report on entry regulation from a local law firm, and work
with that firm and government officials to eliminate disagreements among them.
We use official sources for the number of procedures, time, and cost.  If official sources
are conflicting or the laws are ambiguous, we follow the most authoritative source. In the
absence of express legal definitions, we take a governmental official's  report as the source.  If
several official sources have different estimates of time and cost, we take the median.  Absent
official estimates of time and cost, we take the estimates of local incorporation lawyers. If several
unofficial (e.g., a private lawyer) sources have different estimates, we again take the median.
6Our countries  span a wide range  of income levels and political  systems.  The sample
includes 14 African  countries,  9 East Asian  countries  including  China and Vietnam, 3 South
Asian countries  (India,  Pakistan,  and Sri Lanka),  all Central and Eastern  European  countries
except for Albania and some of the former  Yugoslav  republics,  8 former Soviet  Union republics
and Mongolia,  10 Latin American  countries,  2 Caribbean  countries  (Dominican  Republic  and
Jamaica),  6 Middle Eastern  countries  (Egypt,  Israel,  Jordan, Lebanon,  Morocco,  and Tunisia),
and all major developed  countries.
We record  the procedures  related  to obtaining  all the necessary  permits and licenses,  and
completing  all the required  inscriptions,  verifications  and notifications  for the company  to be
legally  in operation. When  there are multiple  ways to begin operating  legally,  we choose  the
fastest  in terms of time. In some countries,  entrepreneurs  may not bother  to follow official
procedures  or bypass them by paying bribes or hiring  the services  of "facilitators". An
entrepreneur  in Georgia  can start up a company  after going through 13 procedures  in 69 business
days and paying $375 in fees. Alternatively,  he may hire a legal advisory  firm that completes  the
start-up  process for $610 in 3 business  days. In the analysis,  we use the first set of numbers. We
do so because  we are primarily  interested  in understanding  the structure  of official  regulation.
Regulations  of start-up  companies  vary across regions within  a country,  across industries,
and across  firm sizes. For concreteness,  we focus on a "standardized"  firm, which has the
following  characteristics:  it performs general  industrial  or commercial  activities,  it operates  in the
largest  city 2 (by population),  it is exempt from industry-specific  requirements  (including
2  In practice,  the largest city coincides  with the capital  city except in Australia  (Melbourne),
Brazil (San Paolo), Canada  (Toronto),  Germany  (Frankfurt),  Kazakhstan  (Almaty),  Netherlands
(Amsterdam),  South Africa (Johannesburg),  Turkey  (Istanbul),  and the U.S. (New York).
7environmental ones), it does not participate in foreign trade and does not trade in goods that are
subject to excise taxes (e.g., liquor, tobacco, gas), it is a domestically-owned limited liability
company,3 its capital is subscribed in cash (not in-kind contributions) and is the higher of (i) 10
times GDP per capita in 1999 or (ii) the minimum capital requirement for the particular type of
business entity, it rents (i.e., does not own) land and business premises, it has between 5 and 50
employees one month after the commencement of operations all of whom are nationals, it has
turnover of up to 10 times its start-up capital, and it does not qualify for investment incentives.
Although different legal forms are used in different countries to set up the simplest firm, to make
comparisons we need to look at the same form.
Our data almost surely underestimate the cost and complexity of entry.4 Start-up
procedures in the provinces are often slower than in the capital.  Industry-specific requirements
add procedures.  Foreign ownership frequently involves additional verifications  and procedures.
Contributions in kind often require assessment of value, a complex procedure that depends on the
quality of property registries.  Finally, purchasing land can be quite difficult and even impossible
in some of the countries of the sample (for example, in the Kyrgyz Republic).
3 If the Company Law allows for more than one privately owned business form with limited
liability, we choose the more popular business form among small companies  in the country.
4The  World Competitiveness Report [2001] surveys business people on how important are
administrative regulations as an obstacle to new business.  Our three measures are strongly
positively correlated with these subjective assessments.
8B. Definitions  of variables
We use three measures  of entry  regulation:  the number  of procedures  that firms must go
through,  the official  time required  to complete  the process,  and its official cost. In the public
interest  theory,  a more thorough screening  process  requires  more procedures  and demands  more
time. In the public choice theory,  more  procedures  and longer delays  facilitate  bribe extraction
(tollbooth  view) and/or  make entry  less attractive  to potential competitors  (capture  view).
Theoretical  predictions  regarding  our measure  of cost are ambiguous. A benevolent
social planner  who wants to spend significant  resources  on screening  new entrants  may choose to
finance  such activity  with broad taxes  rather than with the direct fees that we measure,  leading  to
low costs as we measure  them. A corrupt  regulator  may also want to set fees low in order to
raise his own bribe income if, for example,  fees are verifiable  and cannot  be expropriated  by the
regulator. 5 In contrast,  higher fees are unambiguously  desirable  as a tool to deter entry  under the
capture theory. Because of these ambiguities,  we present  statistics on cost mainly to describe  an
important  attribute  of regulation  and not to discriminate  among  theories.
We keep track of all the procedures  required  by law to start a business. A separate
activity  in the start-up  process is a "procedure"  only if it requires  the entrepreneur  to interact  with
outside  entities:  state and local government  offices,  lawyers,  auditors,  company  seal
manufacturers,  notaries, etc. For example,  all limited  liability companies  need to hold an
inaugural  meeting  of shareholders  to formally  adopt  the Company  Articles and Bylaws. Since
this activity  involves  only the entrepreneurs,  we do not count it as a procedure. Similarly,  most
5 Shleifer  and Vishny  (1993) distinguish  corruption  with theft from corruption  without  theft. In
the latter case,  the regulator  must remit the official  fee to the Treasury,  and therefore  has no
interest in that fee being high.
9companies  hire a lawyer to draft  their Articles  of Association. However,  we do not count that as
a procedure  unless the law requires  that a lawyer  be involved. In the same vein, we ignore
procedures  that the entrepreneur  can avoid altogether  (e.g., reserving  exclusive  rights over a
proposed company  name until registration  is completed)  or that can be perforned after business
commences.6  Finally,  when obtaining  a document  requires several separate  procedures  involving
different  officials, we count each as a procedure. For example,  a Bulgarian  entrepreneur  receives
her registration  certificate  from the Company  Registry  in Sofia, and then has to pay the
associated  fee at an officially  designated  bank. Even though both activities are related  to
"obtaining  the registration  certificate,' they count as two separate  procedures  in the data.
To measure  time, we collect information  on the sequence  in which procedures  are to be
completed  and rely on official  figures as to how many  business  days it takes to complete  each
procedure.  We ignore  the time spent to gather information,  and assume that all procedures  are
known  from the very beginning.  We also assume  that procedures  are taken simultaneously
whenever  possible, for maximum  efficiency. Since entrepreneurs  may  have trouble  visiting
several different  institutions  within  the same day (especially  if they come from out-of-town),  we
set the minimum  time required  to visit an institution  to be one day. 7 Another  justification for this
6In  several countries,  our consultants  advised  us that certain  procedures,  while not required,  are
highly  recommended,  because failure to follow them may result in significant  delays  and
additional  costs. We collected  data on these  procedures,  but did not include them in the variables
presented  here because we wanted  to stick  to the mandatory  criterion. We have rerun the
regressions  discussed  below including  these highly  recommended  procedures. The inclusion
does not have a material impact  on the results.
7In the calculation  of time, when two procedures  can be completed  on the same  day in the same
building,  we count  that as one day rather than two (following  the urgings of officials in several
countries,  where  several offices  are located  in the same building). Our results are not affected  by
this particular  way of computing  time.
10approach is that the relevant offices sometimes open for business only briefly: both the Ministry
of Economy and the Ministry of Justice in Cairo open for business only between  I  am and 2pm.
We estimate the cost of entry regulation based on all identifiable official expenses: fees, costs
of procedures and forms, photocopies, fiscal stamps, legal and notary charges, etc.  All cost figures
are official  and  do not include bribes,  which  De  Soto [1990] has  shown to be  significant for
registration. Setup fees often vary with the level of start-up capital. As indicated, we report the costs
associated with starting to operate legally a firm with capital equivalent to the larger of (i) ten times
per capita GDP in 1999 or (ii) the minimum  capital requirement stipulated in the law.  We have
experimented with other capital levels and found our results to be robust.
Theoretical predictions  for the cost of entry regulation are ambiguous.  As an alternative
measure, we consider only the component  of the cost that goes to the government,  which in the
sample averages about half the total cost.  The results for this cost variable are generally weaker than
for the total out-of-pocket cost, but go in the same direction.  Our basic cost estimates also ignore
the opportunity cost of the entrepreneur's time and the foregone profits associated with bureaucratic
delay.  To address this concern, we  calculate a "full  cost" measure, which  adds up the official
expenses and an estimate of the value of the entrepreneur's  time, valuing his time at the country's
per capita income per working day.  We report this number below, and have replicated the analysis
using it as a measure of cost. The results obtained using this cost measure are very similar to those
using the raw data on time and cost, and hence are not presented.
Table I lists typical procedures associated with setting up a firm in our sample.  The
procedures are further divided by their fumction:  screening (a residual category, which generally
aims to keep out "unattractive" projects or entrepreneurs), health and safety, labor, taxes, and
11environment. The basic procedure  in starting up a business, present everywhere, is registering
with the Companies'  Registry.  This can take more than one procedure; sometimes there is a
"preliminary license"  and a "final" license.  Combined with that procedure, or as a separate
procedure, is the check for uniqueness  of the proposed company name.  Add-on procedures
comprise the requirements to notarize the Company Deeds, to open a bank account and deposit
of start-up capital, and to publish a notification of the company's  establishment in an official or
business paper. Additional screening procedures that include obtaining different certificates and
filing with agencies other than the Registry may add up to 97 days in delays, as is the case in
Madagascar. Another set of basic screening procedures, present in almost every country in the
data set, covers certain mandatory municipal procedures, registrations with statistical offices and
with Chambers of Commerce and Industry (or respective Ministries).  In the Dominican
Republic, these procedures take 7 procedures and 14 days.  There is large cross-country variation
in terms of the number, time, and cost of screening procedures as the Company Registry
performs many of these tasks automatically in the most efficient countries but the entrepreneur
does much of the leg work in the less efficient ones.
Additional procedures appear in four areas.  The first covers tax-related procedures,
which require 7 procedures and 20 days in Madagascar.  The second is labor regulations, which
require 7 procedures and 21 days in Bolivia. The third area is health and safety regulations,
which demand 5 procedures and 21 business days in Malawi. The final area covers compliance
with environmental regulations, which take 2 procedures and 10 days in Malawi if all goes well.
Figures I and II describe the number, time, and cost of the procedures needed to begin
operating legally in New Zealand and France, respectively.  New Zealand's  streamlined startup
12process takes only 3 procedures  and 3 days. The entrepreneur  must first obtain approval  for the
company  name from the website  of the Registrar  of Companies,  and then apply online for
registration  with both the Registrar  of Companies  and the tax authorities.
In contrast,  the process in France  takes 15 procedures  and 53 days.  To begin,  the founder
needs to check the chosen company  name for uniqueness  at the Institut  National de la Propriete
Industrielle  (INPI). He then needs the mayor's  permit to use his home  as an office. (If the office
is to be rented, the founder  must secure a notarized  lease agreement.) The following  documents
must then be obtained,  each from a different  authority:  proof of a clean criminal record,  an
original  extract of the entrepreneur'  certificate  of marital status from the City Hall, and a power
of attorney. The start-up  capital is then deposited  with a notary  bank or Caisse des Dep6t, and is
blocked  there until proof of registration  is provided. Notarization  of the Articles of Association
follows. A notice stating  the location  of the headquarters  office is published  in a journal
approved  for legal announcements  and evidence  of the publication  is obtained. Next, the founder
registers  four copies of the articles of association  at the local tax collection  office. He then files a
request  for registration  with the Centre de Fonmalit6s  des Entreprises  (CFE) which handles
declarations  of existence  and other registration  related formalities.  The CFE must process the
documents  or return them in case the request is incomplete. The CFE automatically  enters  the
company  information  in the Registre  Nationale  des Entreprises  (RNE) and obtains  from the RNE
identification  numbers:  numero SIRENE  (Systeme  Informatique  pour le Repertoire  des
Entreprises),  numero SIRET  (Systeme  Informatique  pour le Repertoire  des Etablissements),  and
numero  NAF (Nomenclature  des Activitees  Francaises).  The SIRET  is used by, among  others,
the tax authorities. The RNE also publishes  a notice of the company  formation in the official
13bulletin of civil and commercial announcements.  The firm then obtains proof of registration
form "K-bis," which is effectively its identify card.  To start legal operations, the entrepreneur
completes five additional procedures: inform the post office of the new enterprise, designate a
bondsman or guarantee payment of taxes with a cash deposit, unblock the company's  capital by
filing with the bank a proof of registration (K-bis), have the firm's ledgers and registers initialed,
and file for social security.  The magazine L'Entreprise comments: "To be sure that the file for
the Company Registry is complete, many promoters check it with a counselor's service, which
costs FF200 in Paris (about $30).  But there's always something missing, and most entrepreneurs
end up using a lawyer to complete the procedure."
lII. Basic Results
Table H  describes all the variables used in this study.  Table III presents the basic
information from our sample.  Countries are ranked in ascending order first by the total number
of entry procedures, then by the time it takes to complete them, and finally by the cost of entry.
We classify each procedure as one of five types: safety and health, environmental, tax, labor, and
a residual category which we label "screening,"  whose purpose under the public interest theory is
to weed out the undesirable entrepreneurs.  We then compute and report the total number of
procedures and their breakdown  into our five categories for each country.  We also report the
minimum number of business days that are officially required to comply with entry regulations,
the costs arising from the official fees, and the total costs which impute the entrepreneur's  time
(as a fraction of GDP per capita).  Finally, we take averages by income level and report t-tests
comparing the regulation of entry across income groups.
14The data show enormous  variation  in entry  regulation  across countries. The total number
of procedures  ranges from 2 in Canada  to 21 in the Dominican  Republic and averages 10.48  for
the whole sample. Very few entry  regulations  cover  tax and labor issues. The worldwide
average  number of labor and tax procedures  are 1.94  and 2.02, respectively. Procedures
involving  environmental  issues and safety  and health matters are even  more rare (0.14 and 0.34
procedures  on average,  respectively). Instead,  much of what governments  do to regulate  entry
falls into the category  of screening  procedures. The worldwide  average  number of such
procedures  facing a new entrant is 6.04.
The number  of procedures  is highly  correlated  with both the time and cost variables (see
Table VI). The correlation  of the (log) number  of procedures  with (log) time is 0.83 and with
(log) cost is 0.64. Translated  into economic  terms,  this means that entrepreneurs  pay a steep  price
in terms of fees and delays  in countries  that make intense  use of ex-ante screening. For example,
completing  19 procedures  demands 149  business  days and 111.5  percent of GDP  per capita  in
Mozambique.  In Italy,  the completion  of 16 procedures  takes up 62 business days  and 20 percent
of GDP per capita. The Dominican  Republic  is in a class of its own: completing  its 21
procedures  requires  80 business days and fees of at least 4.63 times per capita GDP. These
figures are admittedly  extreme  within  the sample,  yet meeting  the official  entry  requirements  in
the average sample  country  requires  roughly  47 days  and fees of 47 percent of GDP  per capita.
When we aggregate  time and out-of-pocket  costs into an aggregate  cost measure,  the
results for some countries  become even  more extreme. The world average  full cost measure  rises
to 66 percent of per capita GDP, but varies from 1.7 percent of per capita GDP for New Zealand
to 4.95 times per capita  GDP in the Dominican  Republic.
15Panel B of Table Im reports averages of the total number of procedures and its
components, time and cost by quartiles of per capita GDP in 1999.  Two patterns emerge.  First,
the cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio decreases uniformly with GDP per capita.  The average cost-to-
per-capita-GDP ratio for countries in the top quartile of per capita GDP ("rich countries") is 10
percent and rises to 108 percent in countries in the bottom quartile of per capita GDP.  This
pattern merely reflects the fact that the income elasticity of fees (in log levels) is about 0.2.
Second, countries in the top quartile of per capita GDP require fewer procedures and their
entrepreneurs face shorter delays in starting a legal business than those in the remaining
countries. 8 The total number of procedures in an average rich country is 6.8 which is
significantly lower than the rest-of-sample average of 11.8 (t-stats are reported on Panel C).  Rich
countries also have fewer safety and health, tax, and labor start-up procedures than the rest of the
sample.  Similarly, meeting government requirements takes approximately 24.5 business days in
rich countries, statistically significantly lower than the rest-of-sample mean of 55.4 days. In
contrast, countries in the other three quartiles of per capita income are not statistically different
from each other in the number of procedures and the time it takes to complete them.
To summarize, the regulation of entry varies enormously across countries.  It often takes
the form of screening procedures.  Rich countries (i.e., those in the top quartile of per capita
GDP) regulate entry relatively less than do all the other countries.  In principle, these findings are
consistent with both the public choice and public interest theories.  Market failures might be
8 One objection to this finding is that entrepreneurs in rich countries might face more post-entry
regulations than they do in poor countries.  We have data on one aspect of post-entry regulation,
namely the regulation of labor markets (see Djankov et al., 200 Ia). The numbers of entry and of
labor market regulations are positively correlated across countries, contrary to this objection.
16more pervasive  in countries  with incomes  just below the first quartile  of GDP  per capita,
generating  a greater demand  for benign  regulation  in these countries.  Alternatively,  income  levels
may proxy for characteristics  of political systems  that allow  politicians  and/or incumbent  firms  to
capture the regulatory  process for their own  benefit. In the next two sections,  we relate  these
patterns  in the data to the theories  of regulation.
IV. Who gets the rents from regulation?
Theories  of regulation  differ in their  predictions  as to who gets its benefits. The public
interest  theory  predicts that stricter entry  regulation  is associated  with higher measured  consumer
welfare. In contrast,  the public choice theory  sees regulation  as a tool to create  rents for
bureaucrats  and/or incumbent  firms. Stricter  regulation  should then be associated  with higher
corruption  and less competition.
Measuring  rents is inherently  extremely  difficult,  especially  across countries. In this
section,  we present some measures  that we have been able to find that bear -- albeit quite
imperfectly  -- on the relevant  theories. To begin, consider  some variables  bearing on the public
interest  theory. These  variables reflect  the activities  of all firms in the country,  and not just the
entrants. The first is a measure of a country's  compliance  with international  quality  standards. It
is a natural variable  to focus on if the goal of regulation  is to screen  out entrants  who might sell
output of inferior  quality. Second,  we consider  the level of water pollution,  which should  fall if
entry  regulation  aims to control  externalities  and does so successfilly. 9 Third, we consider  two
measures  of health outcomes  that publicly  interested  entry regulation  would guard against:  the
9 We have tried measures  of air pollution and obtained similar  results.
17number of deaths from accidental poisoning and from intestinal infections.°  In addition, we
include two measures of the size of the unofficial economy based on estimates of unofficial
output and employment, respectively.  Since firms operating unofficially avoid nearly all
regulations, a large size of the unofficial economy in countries with more regulations undermines
the prediction of the public interest theory that regulation effectively protects consumers. 1
Finally, we use a survey measure of " product market competition."  Stiffer entry regulation
should be associated with greater competition in the public interest theory, and lacking
competition in the public choice theory, especially in its regulatory capture version.
Table IV presents the results on these six measures of consequences of regulation using
the number of procedures as dependent variables.  For two reasons, we run each regression with
and without the log of per capita GDP.  First, the number of procedures is correlated with income
per capita and we want to make sure that we are not picking up the general effects of good
governance associated with higher income.  Second, we use GDP per capita as a rough proxy of
the prevalence of market failures in a country. Including per capita income as a control is a crude
way to keep the need for socially desirable regulation constant, which allows us to focus on the
consequences (and later causes) of regulation separately from the need.
The results in Table IV show that compliance with international quality standards
declines as the number of procedures rises. Pollution levels do not fall with regulation levels.
10  Due to reporting practices in poor countries, the second variable might better capture deaths
from accidental poisoning in the poor countries, according to the World Health Organization.
I  lThere  is a large literature detailing how regulation can drive firms into the unofficial economy,
where they can avoid some or all of these regulations.  See, for example, Johnson, Kaufmann,
and Shleifer [1997] and Friedman, Johnson, Kaufinann and Zoido-Lobaton  [2000].
18The two measures of accidental poisoning are not lower in countries with more regulations (if
anything, the opposite seems to be true even controlling for per capita income.)  More regulation
is associated with a larger unofficial economy, and statistically significantly so if we use the
unofficial employment variable.  Competition in countries with more regulation is perceived to
be less intense, although this result is only statistically significant without the income control.
We have also run all regressions using cost and time as independent variables, and obtained
qualitatively similar results. While the data are noisy, none of the results support the predictions
of the public interest theory.1 2
The negative results in Table IV should be interpreted with caution.  First, some of our
measures of public goods, such as deaths from accidental poisoning, are probably more relevant
for poor countries, and in particular are unlikely to be influenced by entry regulation for rich
countries.  Accordingly, it might be more appropriate to perform the analysis separately for
countries at different income levels.  To this end, we divide the sample at the median per capita
income and re-run the regressions in Table [V for each sub-sample.  The data do not support the
proposition that, in the sub-sample of poorer countries, heavier regulation of entry is associated
with better social outcomes or more competition.
Second, an even deeper concern with the results in Table IV is that, despite our control
for per capita income, there is important unobserved heterogeneity among countries correlated
with regulation, which accounts for the results.  For example, suppose that some countries have
12 Using data for publicly traded firms, we have found no evidence that countries with heavier
entry regulation have more profitable  fins,  as measured by the return on assets.  These
profitability numbers, however, are very crude.  We also measured profitability using the return
on World Bank financed projects from the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department.
These data also yield no evidence that more regulations are associated with greater returns.
19particularly  egregious  market failures,  but also especially  poor alternative  mechanisms  for
dealing  with them, such as the press and the courts. Regulation,  for example,  might be less
infected  by corruption  than either the press or the  judiciary. A publicly interested  regulator  in
such countries  would choose to use more regulatory  procedures  because  the alternative  methods
of dealing  with market failure  are even worse,  but still end up with inferior  outcomes.
We cannot dismiss this concern  with the results of Table IV, although our later findings
cast doubt on its validity. We run the regressions  in Table IV using information  on the freedom
of the press from Djankov, McLiesh,  Nenova, and Shleifer  [2001], and find that, holding
constant various  measures  of freedom of the press and per capita income,  the number  of
procedures  is still not associated  with superior  social outcomes. We also run the regressions  in
Table IV using a number  of measures  of citizen access  to justice and of efficiency  of the  judiciary
from Djankov  et al. [2001b]. Again, we find that, holding  constant  these measures  and per capita
income,  the number  of procedures  is associated,  if anything,  with inferior  social outcomes.
A direct implication  of the tollbooth  hypothesis  is that corruption  levels and the intensity
of entry  regulation  are positively  correlated. In fact, since in many countries  in our sample
politicians  run businesses,  the regulation  of entry  produces  the double  benefit of corruption
revenues  and reduced competition  for the incumbent  businesses  already  affiliated with the
politicians. Figure mI  presents the relationship  between corruption  and the number  of procedures
without  controlling  for per capita GDP' 3. Panel A of Table V shows statistically  that, consistent
with the tollbooth  theory,  more regulation  is associated  with worse corruption  scores. The
coefficients  are statistically  significant  (with and without  controlling  for income)  and large in
'  We have tried a number  of measures  of corruption,  all yielding  similar results. We have  made
20economic  terms. The estimated  coefficients  imply  that, controlling  for per capita  GDP, reducing
the number  of procedures  by 10 is associated  with a reduction  in corruption  of .8 of a standard
deviation,  roughly the difference  between France  and Italy. The results using the cost and the
time of meeting  the entry regulations  as independent  variables  are also statistically  significant,
pointing  further  to the robustness  of this evidence  in favor of the tollbooth  theory.
One way to reconcile  the findings in Table V with the public interest theory  is to argue
that regulation  has unintended  consequences. Thus benign  politicians  in emerging  markets
imitate  the regulations  of rich countries  with best intentions  in mind, but are stymied  by
corruption  and other  enforcement  failures. This theory  is not entirely  consistent  with our earlier
finding  that poorer countries  in fact have more entry  regulations  than rich countries do. A further
implication  of this theory  is that regulations  should  have a bigger impact  on corruption  in poorer
countries. Panel B of Table VI addresses  this hypothesis  by examining  separately  the
relationship  between  entry regulations  and corruption  in countries  with above and below world
median  income. The results show that regulations  actually  have a stronger effect on corruption  in
the sub-sample  of richer countries.
On the second  version of the unintended  consequences  argument,  it may be impossible
for a benevolent  government  to screen  bad entrants without  facilitating  corruption (Banerjee
1997,  Acemoglu  and Verdier 2000]. In countries  whose markets  are fraught  with failures,  it
might be better to have corrupt  regulators  than none at all. Corruption  may be the price to pay
sure that our results do not depend on "red tape" being  part of the measure of corruption.
21for addressing market failures.  We turn next to the evidence regarding the political attributes of
countries that regulate to disentangle the competing theories of regulation.
V.  Who Regulates Entry?
In this section we focus on the political attributes of countries that regulate entry.  These
attributes are intimately related to the competing hypotheses about regulation.  In the public
interest theory, regulation remedies market failures.  The implication is that countries whose
political systems are characterized by higher congruence between policy outcomes and social
preferences should regulate entry more strictly.  In the empirical analysis that follows, we identify
such countries with more representative and limited governrments.
In the public choice theory, despotic regimes are more likely to be captured by
incumbents and to have regulatory systems aimed at maximizing the bribes and profits of a few
cronies rather than address market failures  [Olson 1991, DeLong and Shleifer 1993].  Such
dictators need the political support of various interest groups, and use distortionary policies to
favor their friends and to abuse their opponents.  The dictator's  choice of distortionary policies is
not mitigated by public pressure, since he faces no elections.  When the public is less able to
assert its preferences, then, we expect more distortionary policy choices.  Specifically, we expect
more representative and limited government to be associated with lighter regulation of entry.
One might argue, in contrast, that dictators should pursue efficient economic policies,
including light regulation of entry, if they are politically secure and can "tax" the fruits of entry
and growth.  One response, discussed by Olson [1991] and De Long and Shleifer [1993], is that
while a few dictators are politically secure and pursue enlightened policies, most are not.
22Insecure  dictators  extract what they can from the economy  as fast as they can both to prolong
their tenure, and to enrich themselves  and their supporters  while still in power. Democracy
might not lengthen  the horizons of politicians,  but it does limit their opportunities.
We collect  data on a variety  of characteristics  of political systems,  partly  because we
want to be flexible  regarding  the meaning  of "good government". Where possible,  we use
variables from different  sources  to check the robustness  of our results. Our political variables
fall into four broad groups. The first includes  the de facto independence  of the executive  and an
index of constraints  on the executive. The second  group includes  an index of the effectiveness  of
the legislature  and a measure of competition  in the legislature's nominating  process. The third
group includes  a measure  of autocracy  and one of political rights.
An additional  variable that we focus on, used in the earlier  work by La Porta et al. [1998,
1999]  is legal origin. We classify  countries  based on the origin of their conmmercial  laws into
five broad groups:  English,  French, German,  Scandinavian,  and Socialist. Legal origin  has been
viewed  as a proxy for the government's  proclivity  to intervene  in the economy  and the stance of
the law toward  the security  of property  rights in a country [La  Porta et al. 1999].
Correlations  among  the political  variables are presented  on Table VI. Political  variables
tend to be strongly  correlated  within  blocks. For example,  the measure  of constraints  on the
executive  power is highly  correlated  with de-facto independence  of the executive  (0.9761)  and
with the effectiveness  of the legislature  (0.9078). Yet, we report  results on all three variables  as
each comes  from a different source. Similarly,  blocks of variables  tend to be correlated  with
each other. In particular,  democracy  tends to be positively  associated  with competitive  and
limited executive  and legislative  branches. Legal origin, in contrast,  is insignificantly  correlated
23with other  political variables (the exception  is Socialist legal origin  which has obvious
correlations  with democracy  and limited government).' 4 Income  levels are positively associated
with democracy  as well as with competitive  and limited executive  and legislative  branches,  but
not with the legal origin.  The fact that countries  with severe  market failures  have more abusive
governments  by itself limits the normative  usefulness  of the Pigouvian  model.
In Table VII,  we present the results of regressing  the number  of procedures  on a constant
and each of the political variables  taken one at a time and the log of per capita income. In
interpreting  these  regressions,  we take the broad political measures  of limited and representative
government  as being exogenous  to entry regulation. It is possible, of course, that both the
political and the regulatory  variables are simultaneously  determined  by some deeper  historical
factors. Even so, it is interesting  to know what the correlation  is. Does the history that produces
good government also produce many or few regulations of entry?  The control for the level of
development is crucial (and in fact our results without this control are significantly stronger).
Market failures are likely to be both more pervasive and severe in poor countries than in rich
ones.  Moreover, our measures of good government are uniformly higher in richer countries.
Without income controls, our political variables may just  proxy for income levels.  Imagine, for
example, that the consumers in poor countries are exposed to a larger risk from bad firms
14Consistent  with this finding, La Porta et al. [2001] find that common law legal origin is
associated with English constitutional guarantees of freedom, such as the independence of the
judiciary and the accountability of the government to the law.  These constitutional  guarantees of
freedom are strongly associated with economic freedoms, but less so with political freedoms.
24entering their markets and selling goods of inferior quality.  The Pigouvian planner would then
need more tools to screen entrants in the poorer countries.
Holding per capita income constant, countries with more limited and representative
governments have statistically significantly fewer procedures for entry regulation using 5 out of 6
measures of better government. 1 5 These results show that countries with more limited
governments, governments more open to competition, and greater political rights have lighter
regulation of entry even holding per capita income constant.  Figure IV plots the number of
procedures against the autocracy score and shows that regulation is increasing in autocracy.
Regulation is heavy in autocratic countries such as Vietnam and Mozambique  and light in
democratic countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S.
The log of per capita GDP tends to enter these regressions significantly.  The
interpretation of this result is clouded both because there are problems of multi-collinearity with
the political variables and because the direction of causation is unclear. In the public choice
theory, burdensome regulation reflects transfers from entrepreneurs and/or consumers, which are
likely to be distortionary and, hence, associated with lower levels of income.  Countries may be
poor because regulation is hostile to new business formation.
Holding per capita income constant, countries of French, German and Socialist legal
origin have more regulations than English legal origin countries, while countries of Scandinavian
15 Results are significant in all six regressions when we use time rather than number of
procedures as the dependent variable.  In contrast, results are insignificant in three regressions
(competition in the legislature's nominating process, autocracy, and political rights) when using
cost as the dependent variable.
25legal origin  about the same. The result that civil law countries  (with the exception  of those in
Scandinavia)  regulate  entry  more heavily supports  the view that the legal origin  proxies for the
state's proclivity  to intervene  in economic  life [La Porta et al. 1999]. Note, however,  that in
itself this evidence  does not discriminate  among  the alternative  theories in the same  way as the
evidence  on democracy  does: French origin countries  might merely be more prepared  to deal
with market failures  than common  law countries.
These  results are broadly  consistent  with the public choice theory that sees regulation  as a
mechanism  to create rents for politicians  and the firms they support.  The public choice theory
predicts  that such rent extraction  should be moderated  by better government  to the extent that
outcomes  in such regimes come closer  to representing  the preferences  of the public. In contrast,
these results are more difficult  to reconcile  with public interest  unless one identifies  it with
political systems  of countries  such as Bolivia, Mozambique,  or Vietnam, where corruption  is
widespread,  governments  are  unlimited and property  rights insecure. Of course, it is possible
that autocratic  countries  would  perform even  worse in the absence  of heavy  regulation  because
market failures are larger and alternative  mechanisms  of social control  are inferior. Such a
possibility  strikes  us as remote, especially  since  we hold the level of development  constant.
VI. Conclusion
An analysis  of the regulation  of entry in 85 countries  shows that, even aside from the
costs associated  with corruption  and bureaucratic  delay,  business entry  is extremely  expensive,
especially  in the countries  outside  the top quartile  of the income distribution. We find that
heavier  regulation  of entry  is generally  associated  with greater corruption  and a larger unofficial
26economy, but not with better quality of private or public goods.  We also find that the countries
with less limited, less democratic, and more interventionist governments regulate entry more
heavily, even controlling for the level of economic development.
This evidence is difficult to reconcile with public interest theories of regulation but
supports the public choice approach, especially the tollbooth theory that emphasizes rent
extraction by politicians [McChesney 1987, Shleifer and Vishny 1993].  Entry is regulated more
heavily by less democratic governments, and such regulation does not yield visible social
benefits.  The principal beneficiaries appear to be the politicians and bureaucrats themselves.
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31TABLE I
List of Procedures for Starting-up a Company
This table provides  a list of common  procedures required to  start-up a company  in the
eighty-five countries of the sample.
1. Screening procedures
- Certify business competence
- Certify a clean criminal record
- Certify marital status
- Check the name for uniqueness
- Notarize company deeds
- Notarize registration certificate
- File with the Statistical Bureau
- File with the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of the Economy, or the
respective ministries by line of business
- Notify municipality of start-up date
- Obtain certificate of compliance with the company law
- Obtain business license (operations permit)
- Obtain permit to play music to the public (irrespective of line of business)
- Open a bank account and deposits start-up capital
- Perform an official audit at start-up
- Publish notice of company foundation
- Register at the Companies Registry
- Sign up for membership in the Chamber of Commerce or Industry or the Regional
Trade Association
2. Tax-related requirements
- Arrange automatic withdrawal of the employees'  income tax from the company
payroll funds
- Designate a bondsman for tax purposes
- File with the Ministry of Finance
- Issue notice of start of activity to the Tax Authorities
- Register for corporate income tax
- Register for VAT
- Register for state taxes
- Register the company bylaws with the Tax Authorities
- Seal, validate, rubricate accounting books
3. Labor/social security-related requirements
- File with the Ministry of Labor
- Issue employment declarations for all employees
- Notarize the labor contract
- Pass inspections by social security officials
- Register for accident and labor risk insurance
- Register for health and medical insurance
- Register with pension fundsRegister for Social Security
Register for unemployment insurance
Register with the housing fund
4. Safety and health requirements
Notify the health and safety  authorities  Obtain  authorization  to operate from the
Health Ministry
Pass inspections  and obtain certificates  related to work safety,  building,  fire,
sanitation,  and hygiene




Obtain zoning  approval
Pass inspections  from environmental  officials
Register  with the water management  and water discharge  authoritiesTABLE  II
The Variables
This table describes the variables collected for the eighty-five countries included in our study.
The first column gives the narne of the variable.  The second column describes the variable and
provides the sources from which it was collected.
Variable  Description
Number  of  The  number  of different procedures  that a start-up  has to comply  with  in order  to obtain  a legal
procedures  status, i.e. to start operating  as a legal entity. Source:  Authors' own calculations.
Safety  & Health  The number  of different safety  and health procedures  that a start-up  has to comply  with to start
operating  as a legal entity. Source:  Authors' own calculations.
Environment  The number  of different environmental  procedures  that a start-up  has to comply  with to start
operating  as a legal entity. Source:  Authors' own calculations.
Taxes  The number  of different  tax procedures  that a start-up  has to comply  with to start operating  as
a legal entity. Source:  Authors' own  calculations.
Labor  The number  of different labor  procedures  that a start-up  has to comply  with to start operating
as a legal entity. Source:  Authors' own calculations.
Screening  The number  of different  steps that a start-up  has to comply  with  in order to obtain a registration
certificate  that are not associated  with  safety  and health issues,  the environment,  taxes, or labor.
Source:  Authors'  own  calculations.
Time  The time it takes to obtain legal status to operate a firm, in business days. A week has five
business  days and a month  has twenty two. Source:  Authors' own calculations.
Cost  The cost of obtaining  legal status to operate a firm as a share of per capita GDP in 1999. It
includes all identifiable  official expenses  (fees, costs of procedures  and forms,  photocopies,
fiscal stamps,  legal and notary  charges,  etc). The company  is assumed  to have a start-up  capital
of ten times per capita GDP in 1999.  Source:  Authors'own calculations.
Cost+time  The cost of obtaining  legal status to operate a firm as a share of per capita GDP in 1999. It
includes all identifiable  official expenses (fees, costs of procedures  and forms,  photocopies,
fiscal  stamps,  legal  and notary  charges,  etc)  as well as the monetized  value  of the entrepreneur's
time. The  time of the entrepreneur  is valued  as the product  of Time  and per capita  GDP in 1999
expressed in  per business day terms. The company  is assumed  to have a start-up  capital  of ten
times the GDP per capita level in 1999.  Source:  Authors 'own  calculations.
GDP/POP,Jg  Gross domestic  product  per capita  in current  U.S.  dollars  in 1999.  Source: WorldBank  [2001].
Quality  standards  Number of ISO 9000 certifications per thousand inhabitants issued by the  International
Organization  for Standardization  as of 1999 to each country in the sample. "ISO standards
represent  an international  consensus  on the state of the art in the technology  concerned...  ISO
9000 is primarily concerned with quality management...ISO  develops voluntary technical
standards  that contribute  to making  the development,  manufacturing  and supply  ofproducts and
services  more efficient, safer and cleaner...  .SO  standards  also serve to safeguard consumers
....When  an organization  has a management  system  certified to an ISO 9000...,  this means  that
the  process  influencing quality  (ISO  9000)  ....conforms to  the  relevant  standard's
requirements".  Source:  International  Organization  for Standardization  (www.iso.ch)
Water pollution  Emissions  of organic water pollutants (kilograms  per day per worker)  for 1998.  Measured  in
terms of biochemical  oxygen demand, which refers to the amount  of oxygen that bacteria  in
water will  consume  in breaking  down waste. Emissions  per worker are total emissions  divided
by the number  of industrial  workers.  Source: World  Bank [2001].Variable  Description
Deaths  from  Log of the number  of deaths  caused  by accidental  poisonings  (including  by drugs,  medications,
accidental  bio-products,  solid and liquid substances,  gases and vapors) per million inhabitants.  Average
poisoning  of the years 1981 through 1994 (the most recent available figure).  Source:  The number  of
accidental  deaths  from  poisoning  is  taken  from  World  Health  Organization  [1998].
Population  figures are taken  from World  Bank [2001].
Deaths  from  Log of the number of deaths  caused  by intestinal  infections  (including  digestive  disorders)  per
intestinal  million  inhabitants. Average  of the years 1981  through 1994  (the  most recent available  figure).
infections  Source: The number of  deaths from intestinal infections is taken from  World Health
Organization  [1998].  Population  figures are taken from World Bank  [20011.
Size of the  Size of the shadowa  economy  as a percentage  of GDP (varying  time  periods). Source:  Authors
unofficial  owns computations  based on averaging over all estimates  reported in Schneider  and Enste
economy  (2000)for  anygiven  country as well as Sananikone [1996]for  Burkina Faso,  Chidzero [1996]
for  Senegal,  Turnham and Schwartz [1990] for Indonesia  and Pakistan,  and Kasnakoglu and
Yayla [2000] for  Turkey.
Employment  in  Share  of the labor force  employed  in the unofficial  economy  in the capital  city of each country
the unofficial  as a percent of thet  official labor. Figures are based on surveys  and, for some countries,  on
economy  econometric estimates. Source:  Schneider [2000] and the Global Urban Indicators Database
[2000]  (www. urbanobservatory. org/indicators/database).
Product market  Survey measure of the extent to which respondents agree with the following statement:
competition  "Competition  in the local market  is intense  and market  shares  fluctuate  constantly". Scale  from
I (strongly  disagree)  through 7 (strongly  agree). Source:  IMD [2001].
Corruption  Corruption  perception  index for 1999. Corruption  is defined  broadly  as "the misuse  of public
power for private benefits, e.g., bribing of public officials, kickbacks  in public procurement,
or embezzlement  of public funds." The index averages  the corruption scores given by the
following  sources: (1) Freedom  House  Nations  in Transit (FH); (2) Gallup International  (GI);
(3) the Economist  Intelligence Unit (EIU); (4) the Institute for Management  Development,
Lausanne (IMD); (5) the International  Crime Victim Survey (ICVS); (6) the Political and
Economic Risk Consultancy,  Hong Kong (PERC); (7) The Wall Street Joumal, Central
European  Economic  Review  (CEER);  (8) the World  Bank and University  of Basel (WB[UB),
(9) the World  Economic  Forum  (WEF). Descending  score from 1 (most corrupt)  to 10  (least
corrupt). Source:  Transparency International  (www.transparency.de/).
Executive  de facto  Index of "operation  (de facto) independence  of chief executive." Descending  scale from 1 to
independence  7 (1=pure  individual;  2=intermediate  category;  3=slight  to moderate  limitations;  4=intermediate
category;  5=substantial  limitations; 6=intermediate category;  7=executive  parity  or
subordination). Average of the years 1945 through 1998. Source: Jaggers and Marshall.
[2000].
Constraints  on  Index  of constraints  on the executive power  based on the number  of effective veto points in a
executive  power  country. Veto poinits  include:  (1) an effective  legislature  (represents  two veto points in the case
of bicameral  systems);  (2) an independent  judiciary; and (3) a strong federal  system. Average
of the years 1945 through 1998.  Source:  Henisz [2000].
Effectiveness  of  Index of the effectiveness  of the legislature. Ascending  scale from I to 4 (1=no legislature;
legislature  2=largely ineffective;  3=partly  effective; 4=effective;). Average of the years 1945 through
1998.  Source:  The  Cross-National  Time-Series  Data  Archive
(www. databanks.s itehosting.net/www/main.  htm).
Competition  in  Index  of the competitiveness  of the nominating  process for seats in the legislature. Ascending
the legislature's  scale from 1  to 4 (I  =no legislature;  2=non-competitive;  3=partly  competitive;  4=competitive).
nominating  Average of the years 1945 through 1998.  Source: The Cross-National  Time-Series  Data
process  Archive (www.databanks.sitehosting.net/www/main.htm).
Autocracy  Indicates  the "general  closedness  of political  institutions."  Scale from 0 to 10  with 0 being low
in autocracy  and 10  being high  in autocracy. Average  of the years 1945  through 1998. Source:
Jaggers  and Marshall,  [2000].Variable  Description
Political rights  Index of political rights. Higher ratings indicate countries that come closer "to the ideals
suggested by the checklist  questions  of: (1) free and fair elections;  (2) those elected rule; (3)
there are competitive  parties  or other  competitive  political  groupings;  (4)  the opposition  has an
important  role and power, and (5) the entities have self-determination  or an extremely  high
degree  of autonomy.  Average  of the years 1972  through  1998.  Source:  Freedom  House  [2001].
Legal origin  Identifies  the legal origin  of each Company  Law or Commercial  Code of each country. There
are five possible  origins:  (1) English  Common  Law;  (2) French  Conmmercial  Code;  (3) German
Commnercial  Code; (4) Scandinavian  Commercial  Code; and (5) Socialist/Communist  laws.
Source:  La Porta et aL f1998],  Reynolds and Flores  [1989],  CIA World Factbook  [2001].TABLE III
The Data
Panel A reports the total number of procedures and their breakup in the following five categories: (1) safety and health; (2) environment;
(3) taxes; (4) labor; and (5) screening.  The table also reports the time, direct cost (as a fraction of GDP per capita in 1999) associated with
meeting govermment  requirements, and direct cost plus the monetized value of the entrepreneur's  time (as a fraction of GDP per capita in
1999) as well as the level of GDP per capita in dollars in 1999. Countries are sorted in ascending order on the basis : (1) of the total number
of procedures; (2) time; and (3) cost.  Panel B presents means of the variables by quartiles of GDP per capita in 1999.  Panel C presents
t-statistics for differences in means across quartiles of per capita GDP in 1999.  Table II describes the variables in detail.
Number  of  Safety &  Environment  Taxes  Labor  Screening  Time  Cost  Cost+time GDP/POP,9,
Procedures  Health
Pand A: Data
Canada  2  0  0  1  0  1  2  0.0145  0.0225  19,320
Australia  2  0  0  1  0  1  2  0.0225  0.0305  20,050
New Zealand  3  0  0  1  0  2  3  0.0053  0.0173  13,780
Denmark  3  0  0  1  0  2  3  0.1000  0.1120  32,030
Ireland  3  0  0  1  0  2  16  0.1157  0.1797  19,160
United States  4  0  0  1  1  2  4  0.0049  0.0169  30,600
Norway  4  0  0  1  1  2  18  0.0472  0.1192  32,880
United Kingdom  5  0  0  1  1  3  4  0.0143  0.0303  22,640
Hong Kong  5  0  0  0  1  4  15  0.0333  0.0933  23,520
Mongolia  5  0  0  1  0  4  22  0.0331  0.1211  350
Finland  5  0  0  1  3  1  24  0.0116  0.1076  23,780
Israel  5  0  0  2  1  2  32  0.2132  0.3412  15,860
Zimbabwe  5  0  0  2  1  2  47  0.1289  0.3169  520
Sweden  6  0  0  1  1  4  13  0.0256  0.0776  25,040
Jamaica  6  0  0  2  1  3  24  0.1879  0.2839  2,330
Zambia  6  0  0  2  1  3  29  0.6049  0.7209  320
Panama  7  0  0  1  1  5  15  0.3074  0.3674  3,070
Switzerland  7  0  0  2  1  4  16  0.1724  0.2364  38,350
Singapore  7  0  0  1  2  4  22  0.1191  0.2071  29,610
Latvia  7  0  0  2  1  4  23  0.4234  0.5154  2,470
Malaysia  7  0  0  1  1  5  42  0.2645  0.4325  3,400
Sri Lanka  8  0  0  1  1  6  23  0.1972  0.2892  820
Netherlands  8  0  1  2  0  5  31  0.1841  0.3081  24,320
Belgium  8  0  0  1  2  5  33  0.0998  0.2318  24,510Number of  Safety &  Environment  Taxes  Labor  Screening  Time  Cost  Cost+time  GDP/POP, 999
Procedures  Health
Taiwan, China  8  0  0  1  2  5  37  0.0660  0.2140  13,248
Hungary  8  0  0  1  1  6  39  0.8587  1.0147  4,650
Pakistan  8  0  0  2  1  5  50  0.3496  0.5496  470
Peru  8  0  0  2  2  4  83  0.1986  0.5306  2,390
South Africa  9  0  0  2  2  5  26  0.0844  0.1884  3,160
Kyrgyz Republic  9  0  0  1  1  7  32  0.2532  0.3812  300
Thailand  9  0  0  3  2  4  35  0.0639  0.2039  1,960
Nigeria  9  0  1  2  1  5  36  2.5700  2.7140  310
Austria  9  0  0  2  1  6  37  0.2728  0.4208  25,970
Tunisia  9  0  0  0  2  7  41  0.1722  0.3362  2,100
Slovenia  9  0  0  0  1  8  47  0.2103  0.3983  9,890
Lebanon  9  0  0  1  1  7  63  1.5672  1.8192  3,700
Uruguay  10  0  0  1  4  5  23  0.4949  0.5869  5,900
Bulgaria  10  0  0  2  0  8  27  0.1441  0.2521  1,380
Chile  10  0  0  3  2  5  28  0.1308  0.2428  4,740
Gennany  10  0  0  1  2  7  42  0.1569  0.3249  25,350
Ghana  10  0  1  1  4  4  45  0.2175  0.3975  390
Lithuania  10  2  0  2  1  5  46  0.0546  0.2386  2,620
Czech Republic  10  0  0  1  2  7  65  0.0822  0.3422  5,060
India  10  0  0  3  3  4  77  0.5776  0.8856  450
Japan  11  0  0  2  2  7  26  0.1161  0.2201  32,230
Uganda  11  2  0  2  1  6  29  0.3040  0.4200  320
Egypt, Arab Rep.  11  0  0  2  1  8  51  0.9659  1.1699  1,400
Kenya  11  0  0  2  3  6  54  0.5070  0.7230  360
Armenia  11  0  0  1  1  9  55  0.1267  0.3467  490
Poland  11  2  0  3  1  5  58  0.2546  0.4866  3,960
Spain  11  0  0  4  2  5  82  0.1730  0.5010  14,000
Indonesia  11  0  0  2  1  8  128  0.5379  1.0499  580
Croatia  12  1  0  2  3  6  38  0.4503  0.6023  4,580
Kazakhstan  12  0  0  1  3  8  42  0.4747  0.6427  1,230
Portugal  12  0  0  2  2  8  76  0.1844  0.4884  10,600
Slovak Republic  12  0  0  2  3  7  89  0.1452  0.5012  3,590
China  12  0  0  5  2  5  92  0.1417  0.5097  780
Korea, Rep.  13  0  0  2  4  7  27  0.1627  0.2707  8,490
Tanzania  13  1  0  5  2  5  29  3.3520  3.4680  240
Ukraine  13  0  0  2  3  8  30  0.2569  0.3769  750Number  of  Safety  &  Environment  Taxes  Labor  Screening  Time  Cost  Cost+time GDP/POP, 9,
Procedures  Health
Turkey  13  0  0  2  2  9  44  0.1932  0.3692  2,900
Malawi  13  5  2  1  1  4  52  0.1886  0.3966  190
Morocco  13  1  0  3  3  6  57  0.2126  0.4406  1,200
Georgia  13  2  0  1  1  9  69  0.6048  0.8808  620
Burkina  Faso  14  0  0  3  2  9  33  3.1883  3.3203  240
Philippines  14  0  0  5  1  8  46  0.1897  0.3737  1,020
Argentina  14  0  0  4  5  5  48  0.1019  0.2939  7,600
Jordan  14  1  0  2  1  10  64  0.5369  0.7929  1,500
Venezuela  14  1  1  3  3  6  104  0.1060  0.5220  3,670
Greece  15  0  0  4  2  9  36  0.5860  0.7300  11,770
France  15  0  0  3  1  11  53  0.1430  0.3550  23,480
Brazil  15  0  0  7  5  3  63  0.2014  0.4534  4,420
Mexico  15  1  2  2  3  7  67  0.5664  0.8344  4,400
Mali  16  1  0  3  2  10  59  240
Italy  16  0  0  5  3  8  62  0.2002  0.4482  19,710
Senegal  16  0  0  3  2  11  69  1.2331  1.5091  510
Ecuador  16  2  0  2  4  8  72  0.6223  0.9103  1,310
Romania  16  1  2  1  3  9  97  0.1531  0.5411  1,520
Vietnam  16  0  1  1  5  9  112  1.3377  1.7857  370
Madagascar  17  0  0  7  3  7  152  0.4263  1.0343  250
Colombia  18  2  0  4  5  7  48  0.1480  0.3400  2,250
Mozambique  19  4  0  1  3  11  149  1.1146  1.7106  230
Russian  Federation  20  0  0  2  5  13  57  0.1979  0.4259  2,270
Bolivia  20  0  1  2  7  10  88  2.6558  3.0078  1,010
Dominican Republic  21  0  0  2  3  16  80  4.6309  4.9509  191
Sample  Average  10.48  0.34  0.14  2.04  1.94  6.04  47.40  0.4708  0.6598  8,226
Panel  B: Means by Quartiles of GDP  per Capita in 1999
I"  Quartile  6.77  0.00  0.05  1.59  1.14  4.00  24.50  0.10  0.20  24,372
r, Quartile  11.10  0.24  0.14  2.14  2.38  6.19  49.29  0.33  0.53  5,847
3rd  Quartile  12.33  0.52  0.14  2.19  2.33  7.14  53.10  0.41  0.62  1,568
4th Quartile  11.90  0.62  0.24  2.24  1.95  6.90  63.76  1.08  1.34  349Number  of  Safety  &  Environment  Taxes  Labor  Screening  Time  Cost  Cost+time GDP/POP,,,
Procedures  Health
Panel C: Test  of Means (t-Statistics)
I  vs 2d Quartile  -4.20a  2 07b  -0.87  -1.35  -3.64a  334a  3.718  V  3.038  -397a  12.03a
I5'  vs 3'd Quartile  -4.58a  -3.02a  -0.87  -1 64b  -2.82a  -4.078  -4.218  2 54b  3.198  16.358
I  vs 4  Quartile  -4.048  -2.08a  -1.55  -1.61  -2.43b  -3.188  -4.09a  3s53a  4.06a  17.31a
2" vs 3'd Quartile  -1.17  -1.34  0.00  -0.11  0.10  -1.51  -0.54  -0.52  '-0.59  6.14a
2'  vs 4"Quartile  -0.72  -1.17  -0.61  -0.21  1.10  -0.89  -1.46  -2 .54b  _2.73a  8.05a
3' vs 4  Quartile  0.33  -0.27  -0.61  -0.11  0.82  0.26  -1.06  -2,1 7 b  -2. 2 7 b  8.53
Note: a  Significant  at 1%;  b Significant  at 5%; ' Significant  at 10%.TABLE  IV
Evidence  on Regulation  and Social  Outcomes
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using the following seven dependent variables: (1) Quality
standards  as proxied  by  the number  of ISO  9000  certifications;  (2) Water  pollution;  (3)  Deaths from
accidental poisoning; (4) Deaths from intestinal infection; (5) Size of the unofficial economy as a fraction
of GDP;  (6) Employment in the unofficial economy; and (7) product market competition.  The independent
variables are the log of the  number of procedures and the log of per capita GDP in dollars in 1999. Table
II describes all variables in detail.  Robust standard errors are shown below the coefficients.
Dependent Variable  Number of  Ln GDP/POP, 9 ,  Constant  R
Procedures  N
-0.2781  a  0.7649a  0.3311
Quality standards  (0.0496)  (0.1268)  85
(ISO Certifications)  -0.1595a  0.0771a  -0.1140  0.5384
(0.0443)  (0.0131)  (0.1484)  85
0.0127  b  0.1557a  0.0247
Water pollution  (0.0084)  (0.0174)  76
-0.0037  -0.0131a  0.2984a  0.2310
(0.0076)  (0.0027)  (0.0314)  76
0.6588'  1.6357a  0.1179
Deaths from  (0.2057)  (0.4381)  57
accidental  poisoning  0.0637  -0.4525a  6.8347a  0.4109
(0.1958)  (0.0933)  (1.0929)  57
2.3049a  -2.2697a  0.3451
Deaths  from  (0.3081)  (0.6778)  61
intestinal  infection  1 O50la  -0.8717a  7.8494a  0.6259
(0.2971)  (0.1012)  (1.3048)  61
14.7553a  -3.7982  0.2482
Size of the unofficial  (2.5698)  (5.2139)  73
economy'  6.4849b  -6.1908a  67.1030a  0.5187
(2.5385)  (1.0834)  (13.7059)  73
19.4438a  -4.1103  0.3132
Employment in the  (2.5756)  (5.9160)  46
unofficial economy  13.8512a  4.4585a  41.5133b  0.4477
-3.6056  (1.3918)  (17.6836)  46
-0.4012a  5.7571a  0.1405
Product  Market  (0.1213)  (0.2511)  54
Competition  -0.1418  0.2108a  3.3579a  0.3087
(0.1202)  (0.0680)  (0.7749)  54
Note:  a Significant  at  1%; b Significant  at  5%;  c Significant  at  10%.
'The  regression  on the  size  of  the unofficial  economy  controls  for  the  log  of GDP  per  capita  plus  unofficial  economy  income
(i.e.,  GDP  per  capita*(l+unofficial  economy)),  and not  just  by GDP  per  capita  as all  other  regressions  on the  table  do.TABLE  V
Evidence  on the Toll-Booth  Theory
The table presents the results of OLS regressions using corruption as the dependent variable.  The
independent  variables  are: (1) the log of the number  of procedures; (2) the log of time; (3) the log of cost;
and the log of per capita GDP in dollars in 1999. Panel A presents  results for the 78 observations  with
available  corruption  data. Panel  B reports  results separately  for the sub-sample  of countries  with GDP  per
capita in 1999  above and below the sample median. Table II describes  all variables in detail. Robust
standard  errors are shown in parentheses  below the coefficients.
Panel A: Results for the whole  sample
Independent  Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Number  of procedures  -3.1811'  -1.8654a
(0.2986)  (0.2131)
Time  -1.7566a  -0.8854a
(0.1488)  (0.1377)
Cost  -1.2129a  -0.4978a
(0.1206)  (0.1285)
Ln GDP/POP,,,  0.9966a  0.97654  0.9960a
(0.0864)  (0.1014)  (0.1118)
Constant  11.8741a  1.1345  11.0694a  0.0677  2.7520a  -4.08938
(0.7380)  (0.9299)  (0.5932)  (1.1176)  (0.2414)  (0.7867)
R  2  0.4656  0.8125  0.4387  0.7662  0.4256  0.7306
N  78  78  78  78  78  78
Panel B: Results for Countries above and below the world median  GDP per capita
Countries  Above Median  GDP/POP,  Countries  Below Median GDP/POP,,
Independent  Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Number  of procedures  -1.8729a  -0.7841b
(0.2971)  (0.3304)
Time  -0.8135a  -0.0923
(0.1762)  (0.2850)
Cost  -0.53278  -0.34088
(0.1894)  (0.1021)
Ln GDP/POP,,  1.4811'  1.5871'  1.7621a  0.3 993b  0.3680c  0.2117
(0.2265)  (0.2789)  (0.2913)  (0.1735)  (0.1802)  (0.1718)
Constant  -3.6970  -5.9027c  -11.3736a  2.3246c  1.0098  1.3125
(2.4628)  (2.9942)  (2.5773)  (1.2849)  (1.8813)  (1.1136)
R 2 0.7820  0.7155  0.6728  0.2362  0.1324  0.2830
N  40  40  40  38  38  38
Note: a  Significant  at 1%;  b Significant  at 5%;  c Significant  at 10%.TABLE VI
Correlation Table for Political Attributes
The table reports correlations among measures of regulation and the variables used in Table VII.  All variables are defined in Table II.  Significance levels are
Bonferroni-adjusted.
ni
0 ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~  rlCD
Exec  de-facto Independcnce.  1.0000
Constraints  Exec. Power  0.9761  1.0000
Effectiveness  Legislature  0.9210a  0.9078a  1.0000
Competition  Nominating  0.8243a  0.8069a  0.8484a  1.0000
Autocracy  -0.9085'  -0.8844a  -0.8514a  -0.7819a  1.0000
Political  Rights  0.8440a  0.8448a  0.8485'  0.7191a  -0.8564a  1.0000
French Legal Origin  -0.1814  -0.1814  -0.1901  -0.1985  -0.0258  0.0565  1.0000
Socialist  Legal Origin  -0.3321  -0.2927  -0.3236  -0.3240  0.54750  .0.4572'  -0.4169a  1.0000
Geuran  Legal Origin  0.2101  0.2008  0.2023  0.1281  -0.1920  0.2444  -0.2141  -0.1479  1.0000
Scandinavian  Legal Orig.  0.3391  0.3274  0.3378  0.2522  -0.2978  0.3109  -0.1727  -0.1192 -0.0612  1.0000
English  Legal Origin  0.2259  0.1998  0.1462  0.2412  -0.2324  0.0778  .0.4874a -0.3365 -0.1729  -0.0139  1.0000
Ln GDP/POP, 999 0.6900a  0.67030  0.7483'  0.6123a  -0.6389'  0.7519'  -0 076 7 h  -0.1995 0.3409  0.3133  -0.0742  1.0000
Ln(Number  of Procedures)  -0.55180 -0.52340 .0.5848  -0. 4435b  0.4662a  -0.44120 0.4863  0.1538b  0 .0030b  -0.3413b  .0.5069a -0.4745'  1.0000
Ln(Time)  -0.5420  -0.5204  -0.5635a  -0.4360b  0.4770a  -0.49210  0.3976'  0.1869  -0.0640  -0.2914  -0.4291  0.50140  0.8263  1.0000
Ln(Cost)  -0.5070  -0.4937a  -0.5656  -0.4177b  0.4075"  -0.45880  0.3472  0.0319  -0.0727  -0.3007  -0.2172  -0.5953'  0.6354  0.61470  1.0000
Ln(Cost+time)  .0.57000  -0.5478'  062670  .0.4745  0.4713a  -0.50850  0.387 0b  0.0851  -0.0933  -0.2786  -0.3094  .0.62440  0.7434  0.7793'  0.9605  1.0000
Note:  0 Significant  at  1%; b Significant  at 5%;  0 Significant  at 10%.TABLE VII
Evidence on Regulation and Political Attributes
The table presents the results of running regressions for the log of the number of procedures as the dependent variable.  We run seven
regressions  using various political  indicators described  on Table  II and (log)  GDP per  capita.  Robust  standard  errors are shown  in
parentheses below the coefficients.
Dependent  Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
-0.  1249a
Executive  De-facto  Independence  (0.0322)
-0.1048' Constraints  on Executive  Power  (0.  0352)
(0.0352  03301
Effectiveness  of Legislature  -0.3301a
(0.0778)
Competition  Nominating  -0.2763)
(0.0999)
Autocracy  0 .054 5b
(0.0178)
Political Rights  (0.3470
(0.2185  .245
French  Legal Origin  0.72450
(0.0916)
Socialist Legal  Origin  0.4904a
(0.1071)
German  Legal Origin  0.72763 (0.1363)
Scandinavian  Legal  Origin  -0.0085
(0. 1733)
-0.0491  -0.0634c  -0.0087  -0.0 9 02b  -0.0867'  -0.0 9 39b  -0.14341
Ln GDPIPOP 1 999  (0.0331)  (0.0352)  (0.0401)  (0.0358)  (0.0321)  (0.0386)  (0.0270)
3.1782'  3.2040'  2.8709'  3.3540'  2.7457'  3.1850a  2.9492a
Constant  (0.2334)  (0.2408)  (0.2586)  (0.2641)  (0.2888)  (0.2599)  (0.1955)
R 2 0.3178  0.2872  0.3424  0.2475  0.2640  0.2350  0.6256
N  84  84  73  73  84  84  85
Note: ' Significant  at 1%;  b Significant  at 5%; c Significant  at 10%.Figure  I  0.6
1.  Check name for uniqueness
2.  Apply for registration  0.5












1  2  3  Procedures
Start up Procedures in New Zealand.  Procedures  are lined up sequentially on the horizontal  axis and described in the
text box. The time required to complete each procedure is described by the height of the bar and measured against the left
scale.  Cumulative costs (as a percentage  of per capita GDP) are plotted using a line and measured against the right scale.60-  Figure II  16.00
1. Check name for uniqueness
2.  Obtain Mayor's  authorization for home office  Cost  14.00
50  - 3.  Obtain proof of no criminal record  (right axis)
4.  Obtain a certificate of marriage
5.  Obtain power of attorney and sign it  -- 12.00
6.  Open a bank account
40 - 7.  Draw articles of incorporation
8.  Publish a business  location  notice  10.00
9.  Register copies of articles of association
10. File a request for a company's  registration  ,5
0  30  1. Designate  a bondsman  c800  o
12. Inform the post office of address
.~  13. Unblock capital  l 
14. Have all ledgers  initialed  6.00  D
. 20  15. Send a recruiting declaration
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Procedures
Start up Procedures in France.  Procedures are lined up sequentially on the horizontal axis and described in the text box.
The time required to complete each procedure  is described by the height of the bar and measured against the left scale.Figure  HII
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Ln (Number of Procedures)
Corruption  and number  of procedures. The scatter  plot shows  the values of the corruption  index against the (log) number  of
procedures  for the 78 countries  in our sample  with non-missing  data on corruption.Figure IV
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Autocracy  Score
Autocracy and number of procedures. The scatter plot shows the values of the (log) number of procedures against the autocracy
score (higher values for more autocratic systems) for the 84 countries in our sample with non-missing data for the autocracy score.F'olicy Research Working  Paper  Series
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